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In her paper, Moira Kloster challenges the practicality of two models of mediation with
respect to disputes that cannot be resolved even when the parties involved have tried their
best to reason accurately and fairly, and despite mediation efforts (p. 4). She argues that
there must be more than a modeling of a critical discussion to resolve a disagreement
where trust between parties is compromised because 1) disputants’ principles are
significantly different; or 2) where trust between parties is deteriorated because of some
other problem with the relationship of the disputants.
Essentially, the two models of mediation presented by Kloster aim to either
promote an ideal model of critical discussion, or focus on helping participants change for
the better to the extent that compassion for others is fostered. She speculates that each
model is limited in methodology, and poses that reason-based mediation models might
not ever help to resolve stalemates. I understand such stalemates to be disagreements
where trust violations inhibit reasoning skills, even when the respective parties are
willing to use those skills.
In my interpretation of disputes characterized by serious trust violations, I will not
enter into a debate about the usefulness of either the reasoning based or relationshipbuilding model because I think reasoning skills are central to both. What I think should
be explored is the character of the reasoning behind relationships seriously troubled,
particular the reasoning that justifies deep mistrust of one disputant. With two types of
cases I will show that the character of the reasoning behind serious mistrust is
unconventional in that where normally we would think reasons for the mistrust are
irrational or mistaken, we make exceptions and consider them both justified and
acceptable.
It is important to point out that the kind of inference that leads to the compromise
of trust in the examples I will explore has not the “logic” of categorical reasoning (as
with Kloster’s reference to, for example, the mistake in reasoning where the identification
of eyeglasses as fitting into the category of cooking utensils might bewilder us Western
reasoners). To my mind, such statements as to why categorical logic fails us do not
accurately exemplify the kind of reasoning - or unreasonableness - that would bring
disputants to mediation. 1 Thus, I propose types of cases that may illustrate why reason
1

I also think that Fogelin’s abortion example is not a practical one for trying to understand why reasonbased models might fail, because people do not go for council or mediation to resolve disputes about
abortion.
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might not be working in disputes unresolved by mediation. My position is that because
reasons for mistrusting cannot be classified as “logical” under current reasoning models,
disputants run into stalemates in trying to resolve conflicts where 1) emotions run
exceptionally high; and 2) where extended lengths of time are necessary to build trust. I
conclude that unconventional reasons for mistrusting require unconventional solutions
specifically that money (not mediation) may be the key to reestablishing trust in
relationships seriously troubled.
The first example of conflict where trust is seriously deteriorated is when a
marriage partner has been unfaithful. The reason that justifies the debilitating mistrust of
a marriage partner who cheats can be, and often is, just one known instance of
unfaithfulness. I think most would argue that this one instance is all the reason needed to
maintain a very high level of mistrust for a long period of time. Also, one instance of
infidelity is often the reason the person hurt by the affair seeks a divorce.
In other everyday reasoning contexts, one instance of behaviour would not inform
what we considered justified true belief of a person’s character. Certainly, one instance of
behaviour would not be the basis for such serious actions as divorce. What makes the
reasoning here unconventional, then, is that people can still considered reasonable when
their evidence is anecdotal, perhaps because the infidelity is considered such an egregious
offense and a particularly gross violation of the marital contract.
Going out on a hypothetical limb here, I’m going to say that some of the
relationship repair before counseling often involves a financial gift or gesture from the
unfaithful partner to the disparaged one. Yet, mediation in these cases often remains
unsuccessful, and I’m going to hazard a guess that what normally results is a financial
settlement that is over-compensatory to the aggrieved party. I speculate here in saying
that in order to get through a divorce and onward with taking care of children, the faithful
partner stands a good chance of getting most everything they want in a divorce
settlement, including custody (if only because an adulterer is often, fairly or unfairly,
successfully deemed “unfit”). The only fitness left after an affair, then, appears to be
financial fitness. I’ll come back to this point about money. First, let us look at the second
case with an eye to the similarities in the kind of reasoning behind the trust problem
between disputants.
I now discuss land claim conflicts, particularly the Ipperwash and Caledonia
disputes. These conflicts are force five conflicts, where litigation is ongoing and the offer
of financial settlement by the “cheater” is a key factor in reestablishing some sort of trust
(the proverbial cheater in land settlement cases being the government). As with the
unfaithful marriage case above, land claim dispute cases are characterized by mistrust
that is seemingly insurmountable. Behind these and other such land claim disputes we
also find unconventional reasons for mistrusting.
The reason for the mistrust of government in land claim disputes, simply put, is
the history of the relationship between indigenous peoples and past governments. Our
governments’ history with native people was tormented by abuse, and this is the reason
used to justify the mistrust of current and future governments. This reason is exceptional
in that we would not normally make such generalizations from past generations to present
and future ones, especially considering the socially transformative changes in human
rights policies and law. The causal connection and generalization that is involved in
believing the argument that past governments behaved this way, and so too will current
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governments, is thus one typically considered to be unreasonable (at least under current
models of Western reasoning). Yet under the circumstance of understanding the
tormented history between government and native peoples, we accept both this reasoning
as well as the lack of trust that follows from it.
More specifically, with respect to the Ipperwash controversy, what would be
considered a fallacy of composition or anecdotal to those who reason under Western
models is how the murder of Dudley George is reason for mistrusting present and future
government in offers to settle land claims. Although the OPP officer who killed Dudley
George was tried and convicted of murder, his death still continues to be unequivocally
perceived to represent an instance of the historical treatment of native peoples – a
singular instance unlikely questioned by most as anecdotal, or interpreted as some sort of
category mistake. His death, therefore, is still considered a valid reason for not trusting
anything the government does, despite any perceived or real threat of his possessing
weapons. Most of us would not question his death with respect to it being a proper
representation of the historical treatment of aboriginals. I think it is safe to say that
because the reasons in this case are so unconventional, that reason-based mediation
models would again fail us in repairing the serious trust problem this case exemplifies.
What is most interesting to me about the above cases is that money might be a
“reason” for establishing some trust, even when the offers of money are seen as unfair or
unjustified. In the Calendonia dispute, for example, some trust was established with
money. Mohawk Chief Allen MacNaughton said that the $125 million dollar settlement
offer was a “…starting point to talk about things and…it’s obviously a recognition that
they [the Canadian government] owe us something.” 2 Although it may seem highly
unconventional to see money as a “reason” to begin trusting, it is being taken as a reason.
In both cases, the financial offer can be interpreted as a gesture of trust, perhaps even a
plea for forgiveness (in admitting wrongdoing, we trust the other in their attempt to
forgive). It is also important for us to see money as an acknowledgment on the part of the
government or unfaithful partner of the problem they caused, the first and biggest step in
healing a relationship. 3 Money is to be considered, therefore, a reason to begin trusting.
I have offered these cases to provoke thought on why we accept such unconventional or
illogical “reasons” as good evidence for mistrusting, and how in some unusual cases of
reasoning how we might establish trust. Perhaps it simply remains that the logical
mistakes in the above cases, like many fallacies, are incorrect but so psychological or
emotionally persuasive that we accept them. Although I remain unsure as to why we
accept normally unjustified conclusions as rational, I am sure it has something to do with
the level of justified emotions in the examples provided. In any case, by exploring the
unfaithful marriage and land claim disputes I hope to have offered a new beginning to
examine stalemate disputes without throwing out reason.
link to paper
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For this quote and many news items and views about the Caledonia controversy, see
http://caledoniawakeupcall.wordpress.com/tag/conservative-cowards/page/2/ (last accessed 06/30/07)
And http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/003194.asp (last accessed 07/01/07).
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I must credit Trudy Govier for this insightful comment.
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